

Lecture of Two Parts:
Part 1: Understanding Cooperation
Part TWO: Inclusion and Development
Progeria
by

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A Little Game Theory: Towards an Understanding of Coherent Communities

by

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A Little Game Theory

- **“All Life is a Game”**
- **John Nash: Nobel Memorial Prize Winner**
- **“A Beautiful Mind” (Book)**
- **Nash Equilibrium**

A Little Game Theory

- **Every Game involves**
 - **players**
 - **strategies or actions allowed the players**
 - **payoffs they play for**
 - **rules they play by**
- **Strategic Game and Interdependence: payoff of one depends upon ones action and the action of others**
- **Players are strictly rational: they prefer more to less**

A Little Game Theory

The Fishing Game

- **The Fishing Game: Two fishermen, Ambo and Berto (for short A and B) fish in a lake. Their strategies consist of either of two actions: Fish with a Net (N) or Fish with Dynamite (D).**
- **Rule: A and B cannot coordinate their actions.**

A Little Game Theory

The Fishing Game

Table 1. Payoff Matrix: The Fishing Game

| | | B | |
|---|---|--------|-------|
| | | N | D |
| A | N | 10, 10 | 2, 12 |
| | D | 12, 2 | 3, 3 |

A Little Game Theory

- Ambo A is the row player, Berto B is the column player
- Ambo can either play N or D, likewise Berto.
- There are four boxes each with two numbers. In each box are two numbers; the first is payoff to A, the second is payoff to B: say $(2, 12)$, 2 is A's payoff, 12 is B's payoff if A plays N and B plays D.
- Which strategies will each play?

A Little Game Theory

The Fishing Game

1. **Nash Equilibrium as Solution: the combination of actions by A and B from which deviation is punished**
2. **(D,D) giving (3,3): no one has no incentive to deviate. If A plays N, he gets $2 < 3$. If B plays D, he gets $2 < 3$. So (D, D) is a Nash Equilibrium solution!**
3. **(N, N) gives each (10, 10) so each player is better off. But A can get $12 > 10$ if he defects, so he defects. B does the same. So (N, N) is not Nash Equilibrium!**

A Little Game Theory

1. Welfare at (D, D) (Nash Equilibrium) = 6 (3+3)
2. Welfare higher at (N, N) = 20 (10 + 10). But not NE.
3. Market Failure in Econ: The Fishing Game is a Market Failure. The outcome (10,10) is better for both players than (3,3). But they will not attain it.
4. Social Dilemma Game: When each player seeking his highest payoff, will receive less than they could receive if they cooperate. Also called Prisoner's Dilemma Game.

A Little Game theory

- **Solution:** Suppose there is a government/community-based management which wants the better outcome for A and B.
- The community-based management passes a rule saying that
 - (a) whoever plays D will be penalized p ;
 - (b) but the players must pay c to defray the expense of enforcement.
- The *intervention* is (p, c) .
- Suppose that the government is very effective in enforcement. Every violation is punished.
- The intervention changes the payoffs of the game.

A Little Game Theory

With Government Intervention (p,c)

Table 2. Payoff Matrix: The Fishing Game with Intervention (p,c)

| | | B | |
|---|---|---------------|----------------|
| | | N | D |
| A | N | $10-c, 10-c$ | $2-c, 12-c-p$ |
| | D | $12-c-p, 2-c$ | $3-c-p, 3-c-p$ |

A Little Game Theory

The Fishing Game

1. p = penalty imposed for dynamite fishing.
2. c = tax on each player to pay the cost of enforcement;
3. (p, c) is the state intervention pair
4. Consider the intervention pair $(5, 2)$.

A Little Game Theory

The Fishing Game

Table 3. Payoff Matrix: The Fishing Game with Intervention $(p,c) = (5,2)$

| | | B | |
|---|---|----------------|-----------------|
| | | N | D |
| A | N | 10-2, 10-2 | 2-2, 12- 2-5 |
| | D | 12-2- 5,2-2 | 3-2-5,3- 2-5 |

A Little Game Theory

The Fishing Game

Table 4. Payoff Matrix: The Fishing Game with Intervention $(p,c) = (5,2)$

| | | B | |
|---|---|------|--------|
| | | N | D |
| A | N | 8, 8 | 0, 5 |
| | D | 5, 0 | -4, -4 |

A Little Game Theory

The Fishing Game

1. There is a new Nash Equilibrium: (N,N) giving $(8,8)$.
2. Post-intervention welfare (sum) : 16
3. Pre-intervention welfare: 6
4. Community Management $(5,2)$ a Success: It managed to change behavior to (N, N) .

APO and Sumilon MPAs

- **What Dr Alcala's Team did: taught fisherman to think and act differently – think as one family**
- **The harvest of cooperation is bumper.**
- **They formed a resource management system run by fishermen themselves.**
- **Prevented the “Tragedy of the commons”**
- **The entry of politics and greed almost destroyed the project.**

A Little Game Theory

The Fishing Game

- Consider an intervention $(p,c) = (5, 1)$

Table 5. Payoff Matrix: The Fishing Game with Intervention $(p,c) = (5,2)$

| | | B | |
|---|---|-------|--------|
| | | N | D |
| A | N | 5, 5 | -3, 6 |
| | D | 6, -3 | -4, -4 |

A Little Game Theory

The Fishing Game with Intervention (2,5)

1. Two Nash Equilibria or Solutions: (D,N) and (N,D) giving (6,-3) and (-3,6): both are bad equilibrium. Why?
2. Post-intervention welfare (sum) = 3
3. Pre-intervention welfare (sum) = 6

Second Part



The Asia Foundation



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Tax Reform and Inclusion (TRAIN): The Role and Meaning of Inclusion

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TRAIN: Meaning of Inclusion

- **Acceleration and INCLUSION**
- **Acceleration: rapid growth in per capita income**
- **Inclusion: reduced income inequality and/or reduced poverty incidence**
- **A policy change like TRAIN can affect inclusion differently**
- **Problem: Suppose it raises income inequality and but reduces poverty incidence.**

Income Inequality vs Poverty Reduction

- **TRAIN intends to raise enough revenue to bankroll BUILDx3 and GCA of 8%.**
- **Fuel tax, sugary beverage tax, vehicle tax, VAT loopholes closures.**
- **Cost of Adjustment: every meaningful reform extracts some pain; no pain no gain**
- **Has tax reduction for the middle class and cash givebacks for the most affected.**

Senate Bill 1592

- Retains 37 of the 70 loopholes
- Reduces the tax take on proposed tax adjustments
- Reduces drastically the Tax Revenue gain
- Explodes the number of earmarks
- Inclusion as reduced Income equality at the expense of acceleration and poverty reduction.
-

But is Income Inequality the real enemy
in LDCs?
Or is it Abject Poverty?

The MDGs and SDGs think
it is Abject Poverty (<\$1.25 per day):
Halved and Zeroed

**Why was our poverty reduction record
very poor?**

Move to Slide 33

Development Progeria

Development Progeria

- Development Progeria: When growth of Manufacturing lags behind that of Services in a “low income economy”
- Abnormal for low income economies, though normal for mature high income economies
- In fast growing catch-up economies: Manufacturing grows faster than Services
- Services now about 58% of PHL GDP

The Malady

Development Progeria

Progeria is a genetic malfunction where children 3 years of age display the physical features of a person of 60.






Figure 1. Trajectory of Philippine Value-Added by Industry as % Shares of GDP, 1986-2009




Figure 2. Change in % Industry Shares 1986 to 1996

Poverty Reduction: PHL, PRC, Vietnam





Figure 2. Poverty Reduction: 1990 - 2010

Manufacturing vs Services: Ave Growth



**Figure 1. Manufacturing and Services
Average Growth: 1990 - 2010**

Exiting Development Progeria

- *Progeria* is an incurable genetic disease; it kills the body slowly but surely
- *Development Progeria* is an epigenetic disease; ravages the spirit but is curable.
- Epigenotypes exhibit plasticity: they change with the policy environment.
- Institutional and policy changes can defang Development Progeria (The British Disease and Thatcher)

Exiting Development Progeria

- Decompress and redirect Investment:
 - (a) Sustainability: Embrace rather than fear a weak peso to sustain investment-led growth
 - (b) Scale up quantity and quality of PHL infrastructure: BUILDx3
 - (c) Lower the cost of power, viz.,
 - (1) Shift Fit in and other charges from Manufacturing to Services
 - (2) Build the Viz-Mindanao connection to complete the One PHL Power Grid

Exiting Development Progeria

- Pass PSA Amendments Bill and lift the constitutional limits to foreign ownership.
- Continue the strategic retreat of government to its core competence: e.g., privatize MRT, privatize NAIA 1 and 3, RCOAize the ECs; .
- Learning from Foxconn: “Slipstream Industrialization”: facilitate local firms’ entry into the slipstream of global manufacturing behemoths.

Thank You!